

TWO PROBLEMS CONCERNING HERACLES IN PINDAR OLYMPIAN 9.28-41¹

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Pind. Ol. 9.28-41 (Bowra ed.2)

- ἀγαθοὶ
- δὲ καὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ δαίμον' ἄνδρες
ἐγένοντ'· ἐπεὶ ἀντίον
- 30 πῶς ἂν τριόδοντος Ἡ-
ρακλέης σκύταλον τίναξε χερσίν,
ἀνίκ' ἀμφὶ Πύλον σταθεὶς ἤρειδε Ποσειδάν,
ἤρειδεν δέ νιν ἀργυρέῳ τόξῳ πελεμίζων
Φοῖβος, οὐδ' Αἴδας ἀκινήταν ἔχε ῥάβδον,
βρότεια σώμαθ' ἧ κατάγει κοίλαν πρὸς ἄγνιαν
- 35 θνασκόντων; ἀπό μοι λόγον
τοῦτον, στόμα, ῥῦψον·
ἐπεὶ τό γε λοιδορῆσαι θεοὺς
ἐχθρὰ σοφία, καὶ τὸ καυχᾶσθαι παρὰ καιρὸν
μανίαισιν ὑποκρέκει.
- 40 μὴ νῦν λαλάγει τὰ τοι-
αῦτ'· ἔα πόλεμον μάχαν τε πᾶσαν
χωρὶς ἀθανάτων.

This passage presents two problems: first, the choice between two opposing interpretations of Pindar's train of thought from the point where he introduces the myth; and secondly, the question of the form and origin of Pindar's version of the myth. In this article I shall (in section I below) state the two problems and discuss their interrelationship, reaching some tentative conclusions about the form and origin of the myth and some more confident conclusions about the bearing of

¹ In this article the following works are cited by the author's name only: C. M. Bowra, *Pindar* (Oxford 1964); L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar* (London 1930-2); G. Norwood, *Pindar* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1945).

this latter question on the problem of the train of thought. I shall then (in section II) discuss the problem of the train of thought on the basis of other criteria, and state a preference between the rivalling interpretations.

I

The first problem may be stated by quoting the two different interpretations of Pindar's train of thought.

The passage is usually understood on the following lines: "It is *kata daimona*² that men become *agathoi* and *sophoi*; for [i.e. to quote an instance in proof] how else could Heracles have successfully defied Poseidon, Apollo, and Hades?"³ Then, with the words ἀπό μοι λόγον κτλ., Pindar recoils from the story which he has just used in illustration; and in the clauses containing the words λοιδορῆσαι, καυχᾶσθαι, μὴ λαλάγει, he admonishes himself for so using it. Thus his attitude to the myth is in some way ambivalent.

Farnell, however, offers an interpretation which we may paraphrase as follows: "It is *kata daimona* that men become *agathoi* and *sophoi*; for [i.e. to dismiss an instance which would contradict this statement] how could it have been true that Heracles successfully defied various

² The meaning of this phrase is considered below, note 38.

³ This was the accepted interpretation of the passage both in antiquity (cf. Didymus in schol. Pind. *Ol.* 9.44a, I 277 Drach.) and in modern times, until Farnell (see note 4 below) argued in favour of a different interpretation. (Cf. however note 4 below for occasional anticipations of Farnell's position.)

Among scholars writing after Farnell, the following accept the traditional interpretation as against his: H. Gundert, *Pindar und sein Dichterberuf* (Frankfurt am Main 1935) 49; K. Fehr, *Die Mythen bei Pindar* (Zürich 1936) 32; R. Nierhaus, *Strophe und Inhalt im pindarischen Epinikion* (Berlin 1936) 113; L. Wolde, *Pindar, Die Dichtungen und Fragmente* (Leipzig 1942); Norwood 80 & 236 note 37; R. Lattimore, *The Odes of Pindar*, translated (Chicago 1947) (cf. id., *AJP* 68 [1947] 171-72 & 172 note 31); J. Triadó, *Pindar, Les Olympiques* (Barcelona 1953); J. Duchemin, *Pindare, Poète et Prophète* (Paris 1955) 157; E. Thummer, *Die Religiosität Pindars* (Innsbruck 1957) 66 f., 70, 97; G. Perrotta, *Pindaro* (Roma 1958); L. Traverso & E. Grassi, *Pindaro, Odi e frammenti* (Firenze 1956); E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1962) 19; G. Méautis, *Pindare le Dorien* (Paris 1962) 413 f.; M. Bernard, *Pindars Denken in Bildern* (Pfullingen 1963) 55; G. Pini, *Vichiana* 4 (1967) 339-42; O. Werner, *Pindar, Siegesgesänge und Fragmente* (München 1967). Of these, only Norwood, Thummer, and Pini discuss Farnell's interpretation (the last two very briefly); Norwood's discussion constitutes the principal statement of the case against Farnell. Cf. also the earlier criticisms of Farnell's interpretation made by D. S. Robertson in a review of Farnell in *CR* 46 (1932) 207.

gods?"⁴ The words *ἀπό μοι λόγον κτλ.* now represent the same attitude as the preceding sentence; Pindar emphasizes his dismissal of the myth, and his use of words like *λοιδορῆσαι* and *καυχᾶσθαι* implies a rebuke to those who accept it. His attitude to the myth is thus clear and consistent; he confidently rejects it as impious and untrue.⁵

The second problem may now be stated. In his somewhat brief allusion to the myth, Pindar seems to refer to a single occasion, on which Heracles fought simultaneously against three gods, Poseidon, Apollo, and Hades (see further below, p. 309 ff.). But this account of a simultaneous contest against the three gods is unique to Pindar; in the other surviving accounts, some of them earlier than Pindar, the occasions on which Heracles fought these gods are distinct. Thus three closely related questions suggest themselves: Did the form of the myth which is found in Pindar originate with him? If it did, was his recasting of the myth conscious and deliberate? If it was deliberate, what was his motive?

Modern scholars have on the whole been somewhat reticent on these questions. Most of those who express an opinion on the first two questions tend to assume that the account of a simultaneous contest

⁴ Farnell I 52, II 68–70. Farnell claims his interpretation as original, and as far as I know he was the first to argue for it at length. But hints of it had appeared already, in a footnote to E. Myers' translation of Pindar (London 1874) ad loc., and in an article by A. W. Verrall in *JPh* 9 (1880) 133.

Farnell's interpretation is accepted by the following: E. des Places, *Pindare et Platon* (Paris 1949) 53; J. H. Finley, *Pindar and Aeschylus* (Cambridge, Mass. 1955) 47, 121; Bowra 54–56; Mary A. Grant, *Folktales and Hero-Tale Motifs in the Odes of Pindar* (Lawrence 1967) 20; M. Simpson, *GRBS* 10 (1969) 113–24. M. Fernandez-Galiano, *Pindaro, Olimpicas*² (Madrid 1956), first explains the passage in the traditional way, but then argues that Farnell could be right. Of these scholars, Finley does not mention any alternative interpretation. Grant merely describes Farnell's interpretation as "the most natural." Des Places and Bowra argue briefly in favour of Farnell. In Simpson's interpretive essay on the complete ode, certain points (e.g. his views on the content of Archilochus' victory hymn: see below, notes 9 & 22) are dependent on acceptance of Farnell's interpretation, so that in a sense the relevant sections of his article constitute a defence of Farnell's position. He does not, however, mention what I have called the "traditional interpretation"; his only explicit statement that he follows Farnell occurs in a footnote near the end of his article (123 note 37); and he briefly dismisses Norwood's discussion (113 & note 5), citing only Norwood pp. 80–81 but not Norwood's main discussion of our passage at p. 236 note 37. Apart from Simpson, none of the scholars named in this note mentions Norwood's discussion at all.

⁵ For convenience, the two interpretations which have just been outlined will henceforth be referred to, respectively, as "the traditional interpretation" and "Farnell's interpretation."

against the three gods originated with Pindar, and that his recasting of the myth in this form was deliberate. Among those who take the further step of suggesting Pindar's motive there is little agreement as to what that motive was.⁶

I now wish to consider the interrelationship of these two problems by examining the question of Pindar's supposed recasting of the myth in connection with each of the two opposing interpretations of the passage.

Let us take Farnell's interpretation first. One of Norwood's arguments against Farnell is stated as follows (236 note 37): "Farnell accepts elsewhere (I, p. 52) Didymus' report that the myth, in this form, is Pindar's invention. But that fact instantly destroys his interpretation, which implies that the story of Heracles' fight against the Three was already familiar. We cannot believe that Pindar invented an impious legend, related it, and then exclaimed: 'Away with this legend! It is impious.'" ⁷ Farnell, as Norwood goes on to remark, did see and state this objection himself (though Norwood claims that he "signally fails to meet it"). In Farnell's words (I 52): "[Pindar] might incur the charge of inventing a phantom in order to abolish it; for there never was such a myth as he states—no story of a battle in which Herakles met all these three deities at once. But there were certain mythic elements that could be combined into such a story." Farnell then refers to the evidence, provided by other sources,

⁶ Of the scholars cited in notes 1, 3, & 4 above, Farnell (I 52), Norwood (236 note 37), Méautis (414), and Bowra (55 f.) assume deliberate innovation by Pindar; Thummer (66 note 1), Pini (340–42), and Simpson (120 note 31) admit it as a possibility, as does Fernandez-Galiano (who also mentions the possibility that Pindar may be referring to a tradition now lost to us: cf. note 22 below). Méautis, Bowra, Thummer, Pini, and Simpson suggest a motive; Farnell, Norwood, and Fernandez-Galiano do not. The following editors of Pindar (some of whom are cited in note 3 above) mention (ad loc.) the difference between Pindar and other extant accounts, but Gildersleeve is the only one of them who expresses an opinion as to whether the Pindaric version originated with Pindar (Gildersleeve thinks it did), and none of them discusses whether Pindar made a deliberate innovation in the myth or what his motive may have been: A. Boeckh, *Pindari Opera* II 2 (Leipzig 1821) 189 (cf. note 22 below); C. A. M. Fennell, *Pindar, The Olympian and Pythian Odes*² (Cambridge 1893); B. L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar, The Olympian and Pythian Odes*² (New York 1890); A. Puech, *Pindare, Olympiques* (Paris 1922); Perrotta; Traverso & Grassi. For those who see no discrepancy between Pindar and other accounts, see note 26 below. The other scholars cited in notes 3 & 4 above do not mention the variations in the myth.

⁷ Cf. also Pini (above, note 3) 342.

for the separate battles of Heracles against these gods, and concludes: "Pindar with his usual audacity chooses to contaminate these stories; and his carelessness is the more natural because he disbelieves and despises them." Farnell thus seems to assume some degree of conscious and deliberate innovation by Pindar,⁸ but suggests no clear motive. Bowra, who accepts Farnell's interpretation of the passage, does suggest a motive (p. 55): "To drive home his point and to make his story an example of something so extreme as to be impossible Pindar combines three stories of Heracles into one."

I agree unequivocally with Norwood on the point of principle, that *if* Pindar has deliberately invented a new version of the myth, Farnell's position (that Pindar refers to the myth with the sole intention of dismissing it as untrue) is wholly indefensible; I cannot, therefore, accept Bowra's explanation of the motive which might have prompted Pindar to make such an innovation.⁹ It must be admitted that Farnell, by allowing a degree of deliberate invention on Pindar's part, laid himself open to Norwood's strictures. Norwood appears to accept without question that the myth as told in this passage is indeed Pindar's "invention"; he therefore rejects Farnell's interpretation with complete confidence.

But we must now consider the question of Pindar's supposed recasting of the myth in connection with the traditional interpretation of the passage. What if the point which Norwood advances against Farnell is applied to the traditional interpretation, which Norwood himself accepts? We have agreed with Norwood that it would be unreasonable to "invent" a legend, relate it, and then dismiss it as impious; but I doubt whether it is much more reasonable to invent a legend and then quote it in illustration of a general statement. This

⁸ Cf. Farnell's suggestion (I 52) that Pindar "on his own authority" may have drawn Poseidon into the conflict between Heracles and the Pylans.

⁹ Simpson, who believes that Pindar is rejecting a Heracleian myth which was told in Archilochus' victory hymn (*Ol.* 9.1 ff.) and is thereby condemning that hymn as an unsuitable tribute to his patron, thinks it most probable that Archilochus told the version, as found in Pindar, in which all three gods fought Heracles together (cf. note 22 below); but he also regards it as possible that Archilochus' version mentioned a battle at Pylos with only Poseidon and Hades, and that Pindar deliberately combined with this the story of the fight with Apollo in order to reject *all* the stories of Heracles fighting against gods (Simpson [above, note 4] 119 ff., 120 note 31). For the reason given above, I cannot accept any theory that assumes deliberate invention for the purpose of rejecting the invented version.

doubt is not removed by the fact that "invention" here is to be understood only in the limited sense of deliberately combining three separate incidents into one. Pindar would have available, to illustrate a general statement he had made, three stories about the prowess of Heracles, with which he might presume his audience to be familiar. It would be most natural for him to quote them the version which they would recognize; and in fact the myth is introduced allusively, in words (ἐπεὶ . . . τῶς ἄν κτλ.) which suggest that the subject-matter was common knowledge to Pindar and his audience. To lead his audience to expect a familiar version to follow, and then to puzzle and confuse them by a combination of three separate incidents, would more than cancel any heightened effect he could expect from an enhanced version of Heracles' exploits.¹⁰ Thus the assumption that Pindar deliberately recast existing elements into a new myth—an assumption which Norwood rightly declared to be totally incompatible with Farnell's interpretation—raises real and serious difficulties even if the traditional interpretation of the passage is accepted. We should, therefore, reject the assumption of deliberate innovation, if an acceptable alternative can be found.

There are, I think, three possible alternatives to the assumption of deliberate innovation; but they can be considered only in the light of the ancient evidence for the three battles of Heracles, which Pindar, according to the scholiasts on our passage, has combined into one. This evidence will therefore be set out here, under three headings, as follows:

¹⁰ Didymus in schol. Pind. (above, note 3) says that Pindar combined three separate battles of Heracles into one in order to magnify his achievement by matching him against three deities at once. W. Christ, *Pindari Carmina* (Leipzig 1896) *ad loc.*, accepts Didymus' suggestion; Thummer (above, note 3) 66 note 1, and Pini (above, note 3) 340–41, are inclined to accept it.

As far as I am aware, the only other suggestion of Pindar's possible motive for altering the myth which is made by any supporter of the traditional interpretation is that offered by Méautis (above, note 3) 414, who thinks that Pindar invented the new version "afin de pouvoir exprimer sa propre conception religieuse, par le cri de révolte du vers 34 [= 35 Bowra], analogue, au reste, à la protestation des vers 51 et suivants de la I^{re} Olympique." This appears similar to Bowra's account of Pindar's motive (p. 305 above), except that for Méautis (who, unlike Bowra, follows the traditional interpretation of the passage) Pindar's deliberate innovation has no connection with his initial use of the myth in illustration of his maxim, but only with his subsequent rejection of it. I am not convinced by Méautis' explanation.

(i) *Heracles against Poseidon*. Poseidon was defending Pylos against Heracles' attack, which had been provoked by Neleus' refusal to grant him purification: schol. Pind. *Ol.* 9.43, 44c (cf. 44a, b; 48); schol. *A Iliad* 11.690, where Hera and Aidoneus, as well as Poseidon, are named as Heracles' opponents, Athena and Zeus as his allies. For Heracles' attack on Pylos, cf. the following passages: no gods fight on either side at *Iliad* 11.690, Apollod. 1.9.9 [I 93 Wagner], and Ovid *Met.* 12.549 ff.; Ares is the opponent of Heracles at Hes. *Scut. Her.* 359–67; Athena is his ally at Hes. frag. 33 Merkelbach & West, and schol. *A Iliad* 2.336; Hera is his opponent at Lycophron 39–40 with schol. (cf. *Iliad* 5.392–94, where Hera is said to have been wounded by Heracles; no occasion is given, but a reference to Heracles and Hades, discussed under item (iii) below, follows immediately at lines 395 ff. Cf. also the fragments of Panyassis cited under item (iii) below). For other certain or possible references to the battle at Pylos, see under item (iii) below. Thus the participation of Poseidon is not attested in literature before Pindar. However, an amphora belonging to the later work of the Cleophrades painter (who is dated to the late archaic period) shows on one side Poseidon, on the other Heracles aiming his bow (Beazley, *ARV*² 183 no. 10). If the painter intended a reference to the battle at Pylos described in our passage of *Ol.* 9,¹¹ the participation of Poseidon in that battle is thereby attested at a date earlier than the composition of *Ol.* 9 (which was probably written c. 466 B.C.).¹²

(ii) *Heracles against Apollo*. Heracles, having been refused an oracle, tried to carry off the Delphic tripod and was resisted by Apollo: schol. Pind. *Ol.* 9.43, 44A, 48. The story is not found in extant literature before Pindar (cf. however Pausanias' remark, 10.13.8, that "the poets have taken up the story"),¹³ but it is frequent in later literature (e.g.

¹¹ Beazley (*JHS* 30 [1910] 48 n. 12) compares *Ol.* 9.30, but is not entirely confident that the two figures on the amphora are connected in theme. A. Greifenhagen (*AA* 1966, 491–92) is certain that they are connected, and maintains that the painter is referring to the same myth as Pindar, despite the fact that Heracles is armed with a bow on the amphora, with a club in the Pindaric passage.

¹² That Pindar derived his account of Poseidon's participation from an earlier source is suggested by Gruppe (*RE* Suppl. 3 [1918] s.v. "Herakles," 1102.26 ff.), and apparently by Farnell (II 70: contrast Farnell's view in his earlier volume, as quoted in note 8 above). (Neither Gruppe nor Farnell mentions the amphora depicting Poseidon and Heracles.)

¹³ H. W. Parke (*JHS* 77 [1957] 278) thinks that these words might be evidence for a sixth-century poem; and J. Boardman (contributing to a joint article with Parke, *ibid.*

Apollod. 2.6.2. [II 130 Wagner]; Cic. *ND* 3.42; Plut. *Mor.* 387D; Paus. 3.21.8 & 10.13.7 f.). This may be the incident which is depicted on the leg of a tripod of the eighth century B.C.;¹⁴ it is at any rate often illustrated on sixth-century and fifth-century vases,¹⁵ so that its existence before Pindar wrote *Ol.* 9 is attested.

There were one or two other accounts of confrontations between Heracles and Apollo. On some sixth-century vases¹⁶ they are shown quarrelling over a deer;¹⁷ in these scenes, Artemis is sometimes shown as well. Whether this episode is mentioned in ancient literature depends on whether this deer is the same as the Ceryneian hind,¹⁸ the object of one of Heracles' Labours, over which Artemis, "with Apollo," disputes with Heracles in Apollod. 2.5.3 [II 81–82 Wagner].¹⁹ It is at least clear that the story existed before Pindar and could have been known to him. Another episode, in which Apollo and Artemis dispute the possession of Ambracia with Heracles, is found in Antoninus Liberalis 4, where Athanadas (*floruit* early third century B.C.—cf. Jacoby *FGrH* no. 303, *Kommentar* [Text] p. 10) and Nicander are named as sources; the evidence for this episode is thus late, and we cannot be sure that it was known to Pindar.²⁰

(iii) *Heracles against Hades*. Heracles attempted to carry off Cerberus, and was opposed by Hades: schol. Pind. *Ol.* 9.43, 44A, 48.

279–80) considers the possibility that a poem may have been the inspiration for the sixth-century artistic representations of the theme.

¹⁴ See Boardman (above, note 13) 278 & note 11.

¹⁵ For references, see S. B. Luce, *AJA* 34 (1930) 313–33, with discussion; F. Brommer, *Vasenlisten zur griechischen Heldensage* (Marburg 1956) pp. 22–27; Beazley, *ABV* p. 725 & *ARV*² III p. 1726, s.v. "Herakles and Apollo: the Struggle for the Tripod"; Boardman (above, note 13) 278–80, with discussion and references to representations in other forms of art.

¹⁶ For references, see F. Brommer, *Herakles* (Münster 1953) pp. 22–23; Beazley *loc. cit.* (above, note 15), s.v. "Herakles and Apollo: the Struggle for the Deer"; Boardman (above, note 13) 280–81. Brommer and Boardman also mention representations in other forms of art.

¹⁷ A deer also appears in some of the scenes of the Struggle for the Tripod: see Boardman (above, note 13) 280 & note 31, 281 note 32.

¹⁸ See Gruppe (above, note 12) 1037.38 ff., 1039.59 ff., 1095.52 ff.

¹⁹ This appears to be the only passage in ancient literature in which Apollo is mentioned in connection with the Ceryneian hind. For other references to this Labour, see Pind. *Ol.* 3.25 ff. with schol. (I 119 f. Drach.); Eur. *Heracles* 375 ff.; Callim. *In Dianam* 107–9; Diod. Sic. 4.13; Ael. *HA* 7.39.

²⁰ However Parke (above, note 13) 277, clearly thinks that the tradition of this episode may be at least as old as the sixth century B.C.

Compare *Iliad* 5.395–97, where Heracles is said to have wounded Hades ἐν πύλῳ (or Πύλῳ) ἐν νεκύεσσι (for a discussion of ἐν πύλῳ κτλ., the meaning of which was disputed in antiquity, see Leaf *ad loc.*); the occasion is not given. This passage may refer to Heracles' attempt to carry off Cerberus (so schol. A *ad loc.*; and so apparently schol. Pind. *Ol.* 9.46, where the scholiast says that Pindar has wrongly taken Homer's phrase ἐν πύλῳ κτλ. to mean Nestor's Pylos, but that it really means ἐν πύλῃ τῇ τοῦ Ἅιδου). But schol. A on *Iliad* 11.690 sees in the passage of *Iliad* 5 (395–97) another reference to Heracles' attack on the city of Pylos; and Pausanias (6.25.2–3), who quotes *Iliad* 5.395–97, thinks the same (Pausanias adds that Athena helped Heracles). Panyassis (frag. 21 Kinkel) is said by Arnobius to have represented Hades (“Dis”) and Hera (“Juno”) as having been wounded by Heracles—here no place or occasion is given. But according to Clement of Alexandria, Panyassis (frag. 20 Kinkel) represented Hera as being wounded by Heracles ἐν Πύλῳ ἡμαθόεντι. It seems clear, from a conflation of the two fragments, that Panyassis located Heracles' battle with Hades in Nestor's Pylos. Compare also Apollodorus 2.7.3 [II 142 Wagner], who says that Hades helped the Pylians against Heracles and was wounded by him.

We are now in a position to consider the alternatives to the assumption that Pindar has deliberately combined three separate contests of Heracles into one. There are, I think, three possibilities.

First, it is possible that Pindar was following an early version of the fight at Pylos, now lost to us,²¹ in which Poseidon, Apollo, and Hades all resisted Heracles together.²² We have seen (above, p. 307, under item (i)) that a version which ranged Poseidon against Heracles at

²¹ We should have to suppose, of course, that this version was lost to, or at least overlooked by, the scholiasts who say that Pindar combined three separate episodes (cf. note 10 above).

²² This possibility has often been aired (usually without any attempt to specify Pindar's source): perhaps by Boeckh (above, note 6) (Boeckh does not make his position entirely clear); Welcker (see below, this note); O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte* (München 1906) I 475 note 6; M. C. van der Kolf, *Quaeritur quomodo Pindarus fabulas tractaverit quidque in eis mutarit* (Rotterdam 1923) 94; Fernandez-Galiano (see above, note 6). Simpson's suggestion (see above, notes 4 & 9) that the version as told by Pindar was found in Archilochus (who, he thinks, drew it from some other source), is ingenious; but against it I would remark, first that Pindar's words in *Ol.* 9.1 ff. seem to suggest merely that Archilochus' song was inadequate, not that it was positively objectionable; and secondly, that if any accurate information on the content

Pylos may well have existed before Pindar wrote. We have also referred (above, p. 309, under item (iii)) to a passage (*Iliad* 5.395–97) in which Homer may have intended to identify Heracles' contest with Hades with the battle against the Pylians, or which could easily have been interpreted as making this identification. The existence of some post-Homeric and pre-Pindaric version which explicitly ranged at least Poseidon and Hades against Heracles at Pylos is thus an easy assumption. Apollo is not quite so easy to fit into the picture; for the fight with Apollo at Delphi, which the Pindaric scholiasts mention in connection with our passage, remains quite distinct. But as there was evidently considerable variation, at an early date, in the number and names of the gods who were said to have confronted Heracles at Pylos (see above, p. 307, under item (i)), and as there was an early tradition of hostility between Heracles and Apollo quite apart from the fight at Delphi (see above, p. 308, under item (ii)), it is not hard to imagine an early version which included Apollo with Poseidon and Hades as Heracles' opponents at Pylos.²³

of Archilochus' song was available to the ancient commentators on Pindar (one scholium, on *Ol.* 9.1A, quotes two lines of it), one would have expected Pindar's supposed allusion, a little further on in the same ode, to Archilochus' version of the Heracles myth to figure prominently in their commentaries, whereas Didymus (above, note 10) knows of no such thing and can only say that Pindar himself originated the story of the three-fold combat.

It was once thought that Heracles' battle with all three gods was depicted on a vase (now *ARV*² 556 no. 101) by the Pan Painter, who is dated to the early classical period (c. 480–450: so that the vase, which belongs to this painter's early work, could well be earlier than Pindar's *Ol.* 9, written c. 466 B.C.): F. G. Welcker, *Alte Denkmäler* 3 (Göttingen 1851) 286–8, with reference to his earlier article in *Bull. d. Inst. d. Corresp. Archeol.*, 1831, 132–36; Welcker suggests that this version was found in that episode of the Hesiodic catalogue-poetry which is now represented by fragments 33–35 Merkelbach & West (see above, p. 307). But it has long been agreed that the scene on the vase, where eight figures in all are depicted, represents the fight over Marpesa (Beazley in *ARV*² loc. cit. [this note] and references there).

²³ I believe that the reasons just offered are sufficient for postulating a version which included Apollo; yet it is possible that there is a more precise reason for the inclusion of Apollo in such a version. It has been pointed out to me that Paieon, whom it would be possible, even if incorrect, to identify with Apollo, is mentioned by Homer, a few lines after the reference to the battle of Heracles and Hades (above, pp. 309), as having healed Hades of his wound (*Iliad* 5.401 f.). Although it would have been impossible for anyone, with the passage of Homer in front of him, to interpret or even misinterpret it as meaning that Paieon took part in the battle, it might be possible that an imperfect reminiscence of the passage, on the part of our assumed source of Pindar, led to the false association of Paieon's name with the actual battle instead of the events which followed it and therefore to the inclusion of Apollo (= Paieon) among the combatants.

The second possibility is that Pindar is following an earlier version in grouping Poseidon and Hades together as Heracles' opponents at Pylos,²⁴ but has himself accidentally added Apollo to the list. Reasons for believing that Poseidon and Hades could have appeared together in an early account as Heracles' opponents at Pylos have already been mentioned (above, p. 310). As regards Apollo, the fact that there existed varying accounts of the identity of the gods who confronted Heracles at Pylos may be used again here, to suggest that the accidental addition of Apollo's name by Pindar, perhaps through an imperfect reminiscence of one of the attested encounters between Apollo and Heracles, would be a slight and easily understandable lapse.²⁵

The third possibility is that Pindar really intends to refer to three separate incidents²⁶ (so that there is no discrepancy between Pindar and

²⁴ As an alternative, we could suppose that Pindar knew of an account which mentioned Poseidon, and that he included the name of Hades in the belief that he was following the account of Homer in *Iliad* 5.395-97 (above, pp. 309), which he interpreted, rightly or wrongly, as identifying Heracles' contest against Hades with the battle at Pylos.

²⁵ Or again, the accidental addition of Apollo's name through a false association of Paieon's name (*Iliad* 5.401) with the actual battle instead of subsequent events could be ascribed to Pindar himself (cf. note 23 above). It is true, however, that this would be a greater misrepresentation of Homer than can be found anywhere else in Pindar, even though there are places where Pindar's treatment of Homer is perhaps confused. In *Pyth.* 4.277-78, where Pindar refers to Homer by name as the authority for a maxim on the worth of a good messenger, he gives only a rough paraphrase of the nearest equivalent to be found in our *Iliad* or *Odyssey*, viz. *Iliad* 15.207. This deviation from Homer's wording could be due to Pindar's having relied on, and being let down by, his memory; but this does not seem to constitute a very close parallel with his possible use of the Paieon passage (*Iliad* 5.401 f.) in *Ol.* 9.32-33, where a serious distortion of Homer's meaning would be involved. In *Pyth.* 3.80-82 Pindar says that the gods distribute evil and good in the proportion of two to one; though he does not name Homer, there is an obvious parallel with *Iliad* 24.527-28; but it has been disputed since antiquity whether Homer's lines mean that Zeus has two jars of evils and one of good, or one jar of each. In this last case, therefore, the relationship between the Homeric and Pindaric passages would be the same as in the case of *Iliad* 5.395-97 and *Ol.* 9.29-35 (above, note 24): two interpretations of each Homeric passage are possible; Pindar (if he had the Homeric passage in mind) has followed one of these; and no-one can say whether Pindar was right or wrong.

²⁶ This explanation is at least as old as Boeckh (above, note 6), who mentions it only to reject it. It is discussed and accepted by Fehr (above, note 3) 33. It is apparently accepted (though without discussion) by the following, who refer in the plural to the *battles* of Heracles described in our passage: des Places (above, note 4) 52; Bundy (above, note 3); and Grant (above, note 4); perhaps also by Duchemin (above, note 3), who refers to Pindar as "rappelant en une synthèse d'un remarquable raccourci le triple exploit d'Héraclès contre les dieux—Poséidon, Apollon, Hadès."

other extant accounts); that he would expect an audience familiar with the stories to recognize them as distinct; and that any impression that all happened on one occasion is simply the result of Pindar's hasty and condensed style of narrative. But in my view Pindar's language, both on first impression and on closer examination, does point to one episode rather than three. If ἤρειδε (line 31), ἤρειδεν δέ (line 32), and οὐδ' . . . ἔχε (line 33) are all dependent on ἀνίκα (line 31), it seems most likely that these lines constitute a three-fold ἀνίκα clause ("when X and Y and Z occurred"); in which case, only one occasion is referred to. It might be argued that, even though ἀνίκα is not repeated, these lines constitute three separate ἀνίκα clauses ("when X occurred, and when Y occurred, . . ." etc.), so that three incidents are meant. In that case, however, one would expect the terms of the main clause (ἐπειὲ . . . πῶς ἂν κτλ.) to be appropriate to each of the separate incidents described in the ἀνίκα clauses; whereas in fact the phrase "against the trident," which occupies a prominent position at the opening of the main clause, would be appropriate only to the incident involving Poseidon. This feature of the main clause would thus have to be jettisoned, as it were, on passing from the first ἀνίκα clause to the second and third clauses ("how would Heracles have resisted the trident, when Poseidon fought him, and [how would he have achieved similar success] when Apollo [on another occasion] fought him with his bow? . . ." etc); this strikes me as unnecessarily awkward. Again, it is possible (see below, note 36) that ἤρειδεν and ἔχε in lines 32 and 33 are main verbs independent of ἀνίκα; but even if this is so, it still seems likely (in view of the emphatic repetition of ἤρειδεν [line 32] from line 31, and the absence from line 32 of any phrase like δ' αὖ to signify a new theme) that these verbs amplify the episode referred to in line 31 rather than introduce new episodes. Finally, whatever the grammatical structure of the lines, it would have been strange for Pindar, if he had three separate incidents in mind, to provide a precise identification of the first incident in the phrase ἀμφὶ Πύλον σταθείς, but to leave the other two incidents unidentified. For these reasons I am strongly inclined to accept the verdict of the great majority of modern scholars, that Pindar is referring to a single occasion.

This third alternative, then, I find unattractive. Either of the other two is acceptable, though the first seems somewhat preferable to the

second. On the evidence available, this is probably as close as it is possible to come to a solution of the second of the two problems referred to in the opening paragraph of this article.

Our discussion up to this point allows us to draw the following conclusions. Norwood is right to argue that the assumption of deliberate innovation in the myth on Pindar's part is totally incompatible with Farnell's interpretation of the passage; but the assumption of deliberate innovation is beset with considerable difficulties even if we accept (as does Norwood) the traditional interpretation. Therefore we should not follow Norwood in assuming deliberate innovation and confidently rejecting Farnell's interpretation on that account. Instead, we should reject the assumption of deliberate innovation in favour of one of the alternative explanations of Pindar's version of the myth which have just been discussed. It thus remains open to us to choose between Farnell's interpretation and the traditional interpretation on any other relevant criteria.

II

Some of the other criteria for a choice between the two interpretations will now be considered.

An obvious criterion to apply is that of linguistic usage. Can it be said that one of the rival interpretations of Pindar's phrase *ἐπεὶ πῶς ἄν* plus aorist indicative is more strongly supported by Greek usage than the other?²⁷

There can be no doubt that the construction of aorist indicative with *ἄν* permits either interpretation. The traditional interpretation requires that the clause be construed as the apodosis of a past unreal condition, with the protasis unexpressed but understood: "for [if that were not so], how would Heracles have fought [as he in fact did]?"²⁸ *ἐπεὶ*, one might say, is to be understood as "for otherwise." Farnell's

²⁷ Hardly any commentators discuss this point. Even those who have actively engaged in the controversy over the rivalling interpretations seem, for the most part, simply to assume that both interpretations are equally admissible as regards linguistic usage. As will appear, I believe that this conclusion is correct; but some discussion of the point would have been in order.

²⁸ The rhetorical question introduced by *πῶς* is (on either interpretation of the passage) equivalent to a negative.

interpretation takes the clause as a past potential, with no reference to any particular condition: "for how could it have been possible for Heracles to fight? how was Heracles likely to fight?" (with the implication that he did not do so); *ἐπεὶ* then means simply "for." Both these constructions of aorist indicative with *ἄν* are too common to call for illustration.²⁹

As both interpretations are syntactically admissible, it is natural to ask whether one interpretation is idiomatically or stylistically preferable to the other, i.e. whether the expression *ἐπεὶ τῶς ἄν* plus past indicative has something of a formulaic nature and occurs regularly in one usage rather than the other. But in fact I have not been able to find an exactly parallel example of this expression. It is true that *ἐπεὶ* with imperfect or aorist indicative plus *ἄν* is often found³⁰ (in what amounts to a stereotyped usage) with the meaning "for else [if X were not the case], Y would (or would not) have happened," a meaning which is in accordance with the traditional interpretation of our passage of Pindar; and it is possible that Pindar's *ἐπεὶ . . . πῶς ἄν κτλ.* would have been instinctively assimilated by his hearers as a slight variation of the common idiom with *ἐπεὶ* just noted, with the same basic meaning; yet the fact remains that none of the examples of this common idiom of which I am aware (certainly none of the examples listed by Headlam-Knox [above, note 30]) combines *πῶς* (in a rhetorical question) with *ἐπεὶ . . . ἄν* plus past indicative.³¹ But *πῶς* plus aorist indicative with *ἄν*, in a rhetorical question, is found³² (without *ἐπεὶ*) in the sense required by Farnell's interpretation of our passage, viz. as a past

²⁹ Des Places (above, note 4) is mistaken if he means to suggest that Farnell's interpretation is syntactically preferable ("Mieux vaut sans doute, avec Farnell, donner à l'irréel son plein sens et traduire: 'Car comment pourrait-il être vrai. . .'" etc.).

³⁰ Examples are listed in Headlam-Knox on Herodas 2. 72. In view of the large number of examples listed, Bowra's remark (55), in defence of Farnell's interpretation of our passage, that "*ἐπεὶ* . . . means not 'for otherwise' but simply, as we should expect, 'for'" is hardly justified. Examples of the same construction with *γάρ* (instead of *ἐπεὶ*) are also common (examples in Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, para. 247).

³¹ Headlam-Knox do however cite Paul *Rom.* 3.6, *μὴ ἀδικὸς ὁ Θεὸς ὁ ἐπιφέρων τὴν ὀργὴν (κατὰ ἀνθρώπον λέγω); μὴ γένοιτο· ἐπεὶ πῶς κρινεῖ ὁ Θεὸς τὸν κόσμον;* "for [if God is unjust] how will he judge the world [as he is obviously going to do]?", an example which clearly has affinities with our passage of *Ol.* 9 as traditionally interpreted.

³² *πῶς ἄν ὁ μὴ παρὼν μηδ' ἐπιδημῶν ἐγὼ τί σ' ἠδίκησα;* Demosth. 37.57 ("how could I have wronged you? how was I likely to wrong you?"). I have not found any other exactly parallel example of this usage.

potential with no condition implied: "how could X have happened? how was X likely to happen?" In short, it seems that the evidence is insufficient to allow us to decide between the two interpretations on grounds of usage.

An argument that has sometimes been advanced³³ against Farnell's interpretation is that Pindar would not have included so many details³⁴ in a story which he meant to reject. Norwood objects to "ἀμφὶ Πύλον σταθείς [line 31] and the like"; but surely this bare geographical reference does no more than indicate which myth Pindar has in mind. Norwood's point might have carried more weight had he singled out (for example) ἀργυρέω τόξω πελεμίζων, which might seem to be a mere picturesque detail. But it need not be; rather, it could combine with the mention of Poseidon's trident and Hades' wand to stress the might of the gods whom Heracles defied and so to heighten the improbability and impiety of the story.³⁵

A related question, which I have not seen discussed before, concerns the grammatical form of the clauses ἀνίκα . . . ἤρειδε κτλ.³⁶ The use of ἀνίκα plus imperfect indicative may be felt to be more obviously in harmony with the traditional interpretation, according to which it represents an actual occasion, than with Farnell's interpretation, which denies the actuality of the occasion. However, the difficulty which this causes for Farnell's interpretation is seen to be less serious than it may at first appear, if one asks by what other means it would have been feasible or natural for Pindar (intending rejection of the myth, and having embarked on the ἐπεὶ . . . πῶς ἄν clause in its present form) to identify the occasion referred to. The addition of some modifying phrase to indicate the non-reality of the occasion (e.g. "when Poseidon, as they say, fought") would surely have been pedantically over-exact;

³³ Robertson (above, note 3); Norwood 236 note 37.

³⁴ Viz. in the clauses from ἀνίκα (line 31) to θνασκόντων (line 35).

³⁵ According to the traditional interpretation of the passage, such details could of course be said to heighten Heracles' achievement. My point is simply that they do not constitute a convincing objection to Farnell, and can easily be made to do duty for him.

³⁶ My remarks are based on the assumption that the words ἤρειδε δέ and οὐδ' . . . ἔχε (lines 32–33) depend on ἀνίκα in line 31 and are thus parallel in construction to the first ἤρειδε in line 31 (so most editors). It would also be possible to regard the second ἤρειδεν (line 32) and ἔχε (line 33) as main verbs in a new sentence (so C. G. Heyne, *Pindari Carmina* [Leipzig 1817] II p. 29: *quum . . . obniteretur . . . Neptunus? obnibaturque . . . Phoebus*; etc.); in that case, these two verbs make independent statements of fact, and only the traditional interpretation of the passage would be possible.

that no such addition is necessary is suggested by the common use of past tenses of the indicative in conditional relative clauses to express a condition that is not or was not fulfilled.³⁷

In short, both the detailed content and the grammatical form of the *ἀνίκα* clauses may well leave the impression that the traditional interpretation is the easier and more natural one; but they by no means exclude Farnell's interpretation, which can, I believe, be successfully defended on both counts.

Finally, there is a whole complex of questions which can be separately formulated, but which in practice cannot be entirely isolated from each other in discussion. We must consider: the relevance of the Heracles myth (introduced as it is by the word *ἐπεὶ*) to the maxim which immediately precedes it (*ἀγαθοὶ . . . κατὰ δαίμονα κτλ.*); the development of thought within our passage, in particular the relationship between the reference to the Heracles myth in the *ἐπεὶ . . . πῶς ἄν* clause and the dismissal of the myth in lines 35 ff. (*ἀπό μοι λόγον κτλ.*); and the significance of Pindar's references to his own art in our passage and the surrounding context.

Not only are there different possible answers to these questions; there are different sets of criteria on which to base the search for the answers. On the one hand, we may look for clarity and consistency, for confident beliefs and attitudes on Pindar's part and precise statements of those beliefs, for self-confidence in his own poetic role; or, on the other hand, we may expect to find, or allow ourselves to find, some obscurity or inconsistency, some hesitation of belief or ambivalence of attitude, some wavering in Pindar's self-confidence. The choice between the

³⁷ If the form of Pindar's expression had been: "The story of Heracles' successful confrontation with the gods is untrue; for Heracles could not have defeated the gods when they fought against him" (*ἀνίκα* plus imperfect or aorist indicative), the sentence would have been closely parallel to some of the examples of conditional relative with imperfect or aorist indicative quoted by Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, para. 528 (cf. para. 559); "when they fought" would have been equivalent to "if they had fought," with the implication that they did not do so. In our passage, it can be argued, the reason why the *ἀνίκα* clause is expanded into a three-fold clause with a wealth of incidental detail, thus appearing to differ from a conditional relative clause and seeming to refer to an actual occasion, is that the occasion was generally believed, in accordance with mythical tradition, to have been an actual one, and is identified by Pindar, for his audience, by means of the details included, even though for Pindar himself it is not (on Farnell's interpretation) an actual occasion. This would, I think, be an easy extension or adaptation of a common construction.

rivalling interpretations will be found to turn largely on which set of criteria is adopted.

Our discussion will include some mention of certain other passages of Pindar which have been quoted as parallel to ours. It is natural to ask whether our passage has significant common features with any other passages whose interpretation is not in doubt and which therefore point clearly to one or the other of the two interpretations of our passage. What we find, however, is that the adherents of both interpretations quote, in support of their own viewpoint, other Pindaric passages which can reasonably be said to bear some resemblance, in their different ways, to our passage; that the *same* passage (*Ol.* 1.25-53) is quoted in support or illustration by the adherents of *both* the two different interpretations of our passage; and that the passages quoted as parallel are not always themselves free from controversy. There is no other passage in Pindar, it seems, which is exactly parallel to our passage; and the comparison of those passages which bear some affinities with ours can clarify and enrich, but not resolve, the debate between the two rival interpretations.

We may now ask whether the myth of Heracles' battle with the gods is more reasonably regarded as illustrating and confirming the aphorism ἀγαθοὶ . . . κατὰ δαίμον' ἄνδρες ἐγένοντο (so the traditional interpretation) or as contradicting it (so Farnell). Farnell argues (*I* 52; *II* 69) that it would have been absurd for Pindar to illustrate the divine source of human success³⁸ by a story in which gods are defied by a mortal hero,³⁹ especially as Pindar could easily have selected a story

³⁸ This point obviously depends on the meaning given to κατὰ δαίμονα. Farnell (*II* 69) translates "in accordance with divine will," and most commentators (including Bowra [30] and Norwood [236 note 37]) understand the phrase in a similar way. My discussion is based on the assumption that this is the correct explanation.

Other possible meanings are Fennell's "in divine measure," κατὰ δαίμονα being understood as the antithesis of κατ' ἀνθρώπων, or Lattimore's "by the divine element in [men]" (in *AJP* [above, note 3]). These explanations do not involve the same explicit statement of the gods' active conferment of prowess as does the common explanation of the phrase, and therefore do not involve the same apparent contradiction between maxim and myth.

Any meaning such as "according to their fate" or "by chance" (cf. Gildersleeve's κατ' αἰσαν) would, in my view, be too colourless to call either for illustration by means of the Heracles myth or for vindication by means of the rejection of the Heracles myth.

³⁹ Whatever Pindar may say elsewhere about the ultimate divine status of Heracles (e.g. *Ol.* 3.36), he is obviously mentioned here in illustration of ἄνδρες. Cf. Farnell's

which would have illustrated his maxim without such a contradiction.⁴⁰ This argument (which is not discussed by Norwood in his attempted refutation of Farnell) certainly seems to carry great weight, if one insists that the myth—assuming that it is quoted in illustration at all—must simply *illustrate* the maxim in a clear and unambiguous manner. But it could also be argued that the myth, as well as illustrating the maxim by instancing certain feats which could only have been performed by divinely granted prowess, is meant to *add* the counterbalancing theme that such prowess can be used against the gods themselves, that in extreme instances the gods may, as it were, run a risk in elevating mortals to a position from which they can challenge the gods, that the poet senses and expresses a tension between the divine source or nature of the prowess of certain favoured mortals and its impious potentialities. Thus on Farnell's interpretation the relationship between maxim and myth is more direct and precise; but the traditional interpretation could be said to relate them in a more profound and significant way.

We may now consider Pindar's train of thought in the transition from ἐπεὶ . . . πῶς ἄν κτλ. to ἀπό μοι λόγον κτλ.

According to Farnell's interpretation, Pindar's attitude to the myth is clear and consistent throughout. The myth, if true, would constitute an objection to Pindar's maxim on the divine source of human prowess; therefore he quotes it, in the ἐπεὶ πῶς ἄν clause, with the sole purpose of denying its truth, and he reinforces this denial in ἀπό μοι λόγον κτλ.

The passage of *Ol.* 1 (25–53), where Pindar rejects as impious the story that the gods feasted on Pelops, is quoted by some supporters⁴¹ of Farnell's interpretation as parallel to our passage of *Ol.* 9. As this passage of *Ol.* 1 does seem to contain a definite denial of the truth of a given myth, it is, thus far, parallel to our passage of *Ol.* 9 as interpreted

remark in another context (II 256, Commentary on *Nem.* 3.22): "Pindar's belief that Herakles was originally a man is certain and clear."

⁴⁰ Farnell is right to argue (II 69) that the contradiction which he sees here is not removed by the suggestion that Zeus must have lent Heracles superhuman prowess for the occasion. Farnell does not quote any references for this suggestion, of which there is a hint in Gildersleeve (above, note 6) 202, and which is later offered by Fernandez-Galiano (above, note 4); it does not appear to be supported by any ancient authority.

⁴¹ Des Places (above, note 4); Bowra 56.

by Farnell. But the structure of the two passages is very different; there are major difficulties of interpretation in the passage of *Ol.* 1 itself;⁴² and the passage of *Ol.* 1 is also quoted, by way of comparison, by some supporters⁴³ of the *traditional interpretation* of our passage. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the passage of *Ol.* 1 points unambiguously to either one of the rival interpretations of our passage.

According to the traditional interpretation, Pindar first, in the *ἐπεὶ πῶς ἄν* clause, introduces the Heracles myth as an illustration of his maxim, and then, in *ἀπό μοι λόγον κτλ.*, in some sense rejects the myth; there is thus, inevitably, some change of position on Pindar's part. But, within this framework, there are a number of variations of the traditional interpretation, which see varying degrees of clarity and precision in Pindar's attitude to the myth, and explain his change of position in different ways.⁴⁴

Let us take first that version of the traditional interpretation according to which Pindar adheres throughout to a belief in the truth of the myth.

⁴² The passage is too long to be quoted here; but some observations may be made. There are, I think, sufficient indications (*δεδαυδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι . . . μῦθοι*, line 29; *ἀντία προτέρων φθέγξομαι*, line 36) to make it certain that Pindar denies the truth of the story of the gods' cannibalism, even though some phrases ("it is fitting for a man to speak well of the gods," line 35; "it is impossible for me to call any of the gods gluttonous," line 52; *ἀφίσταμαι* *ibid.*) would in themselves also have allowed the view that Pindar merely sets the story aside without denying its truth. It is also certain that Pindar substitutes an acceptable version (*φθέγξομαι κτλ.*, lines 36-42) for the version which he rejects. The main problem concerns the reference, at the opening of the passage (lines 26 f.), to Pelops' being taken from the cauldron complete with ivory shoulder. *Either* this reference is part of Pindar's own acceptable version, and the various allusions to the deception of lying tales (line 29), the desirability of speaking well of the gods (line 35), and the misfortune that befalls slanderers (line 53), are meant to distinguish Pindar himself from the purveyors of the impious version; in this case Pindar's attitude to the myth is consistent and clear. *Or* this reference is itself part of the impious version, on which Pindar embarks before checking himself and substituting a more acceptable tale; and in the allusions to lying tales etc., Pindar warns himself, in a reproachful tone, of the dangers of being deceived by false tales or of aligning himself with slanderers; in this case, Pindar in some way changes his position with regard to the myth. (See further note 54 below.)

⁴³ E.g. Gildersleeve (above, note 6); Méautis (above, note 10).

⁴⁴ We shall be considering versions of the traditional interpretation which variously hold either that Pindar accepts the truth of the myth, or that he denies the truth of the myth, or that he remains non-committal about the truth of the myth; and which explain Pindar's train of thought, in the transition from apparent acceptance to apparent rejection of the myth, in correspondingly different ways. It should be said that most adherents of the traditional interpretation (whether writing before or after Farnell) express no opinion on these matters.

The most obvious implication of the view that Pindar quotes the myth (in ἐπεὶ . . . πῶς ἂν κτλ.) in illustration of his maxim is that he accepts the truth of the myth. Therefore the most obvious explanation of ἀπό μοι λόγον κτλ. is that Pindar does not here deny the truth of the myth but continues to accept it as true while reproaching himself for being bold enough to quote it. This is the view of Norwood, who classes our passage as one of a number of passages⁴⁵ in which "Pindar says, actually or in effect: 'I have made a mistake in embarking on this true story.'" (Norwood 80, & 235 note 36).⁴⁶

It may be felt that some difficulty is involved,⁴⁷ if Pindar accepts the myth as true and throws it into prominence by using it in illustration, yet proceeds to reproach himself for quoting it. But it can be argued that this is the kind of difficulty which is inherent in the complexity of poetic statement. We have already (above, p. 318) suggested a reason why Pindar could not simply have substituted a more innocuous tale of outstanding human prowess, viz. that he felt that divinely granted prowess possesses, paradoxically, the impious potentiality of leading mortals to challenge the gods and involving the gods in combat as they meet the challenge. In quoting the myth in illustration and then setting it aside, Pindar, it may be said, expresses his own complex and ambivalent attitude, which is one of mixed reverence and revulsion, to a paradoxical and complex situation.

If we accept, with Norwood, that Pindar consistently accepts the truth of the myth, the passage is best explained, I believe, on the lines just suggested. Norwood's own explanation, however, is different.

⁴⁵ Norwood (80) designates these as "hush-passages." Besides our passage of *Ol.* 9, they are:—(a) *Nem.* 5.14 ff. Here Pindar hesitates to tell the story of the murder by Peleus and Telamon of their half-brother. He opens the passage with the words αἰδέομαι . . . εἰπεῖν, then hints at the story, then stops short with the word στάσομαι (line 16), and adds words to the effect that truth should not always show its face and silence is often wisest. (b) *Pyth.* 11.38 ff. Here, having dwelt on the house of Agamemnon, he stops short, declaring that he has been caught in confusion at the crossroads or that a wind has blown him off course. (c) *Nem.* 3.26 f. Here, having dilated on the exploits of Heracles, he asks: "My soul, to what foreign headland are you misdirecting my voyage?"

⁴⁶ Norwood (235 note 36) distinguishes these passages from the passage of *Ol.* 1 (25–53), where the truth of a myth is denied.

⁴⁷ So (apparently) des Places (above, note 4), who in rejecting the traditional interpretation, states that, according to it, "Pindare semble approuver provisoirement des faits et gestes qu' il condamne avec énergie aux vers 35–39"

He appears to believe, not merely that our passage and his three other "hush-passages" (above, note 45) have the same formal features in common, namely that Pindar in some way recoils from a (true) story which he has just outlined, but that Pindar's thought-processes in all four passages can be accounted for by a common explanation, which he finds (80-81) in Pindar's feeling about the change which he has wrought in lyric narrative.⁴⁸ Whatever may be thought of his explanation as applied to the other three "hush-passages" (to say the least, it is unfortunately worded in parts), it is in my view totally inadequate as an explanation of our passage of *Ol.* 9.

Is it possible to take the opposite view to that which we have just been considering, i.e. to maintain (still within the framework of the traditional interpretation) that in lines 35 ff. (ἀπό μοι λόγον κτλ.) Pindar denies the truth of the myth? For this is the form in which Farnell (II 69), in justifying his own interpretation, represents the traditional interpretation, according to which, he alleges, Pindar asserts his disbelief in the story.⁴⁹ I think that Farnell is here (unintentionally) misrepresenting the traditional interpretation; for while its adherents inevitably hold that Pindar, after quoting the story in illustration, in some sense dismisses or recoils from it, hardly any of them explicitly says that he denies it to be true.⁵⁰ If Pindar *were* denying the truth of the myth, there would be, within the context of the traditional interpretation, two theoretically possible accounts of the relationship

⁴⁸ "He takes pride in it [viz. the change in lyric narrative] and is sensitive to the criticism which it has undergone. At points where his novel method is strongly at work he grows self-conscious, more self-conscious than usual . . . the eyes of the world are upon him, and he stares back defiantly . . . the car of the Muses veers abruptly . . . proud of his new-found virtuosity, affecting and perhaps feeling some astonishment like a child half delighted, half scared, by a new toy that performs exciting prodigies, he underlines the novelty by a pretence that his inspiration has run away with him, precisely when it is feeling the rein most strongly." (This last sentence, which it is impossible to summarise, is quoted in full, with Norwood's own punctuation.)

⁴⁹ Farnell II 69: "It is as if [Pindar] said, 'we are dependent on the gods for our prowess and wisdom: the proof of this is that Herakles successfully defied three powerful gods; but I do not believe that shocking story.' This is mere fooling; and poetic logic is not so brainless on this."

⁵⁰ Cf. notes 51 & 52 below. It is true that most commentators, including most supporters of the traditional interpretation, take the phrase *ἐκ πόλεμον μάχαν τε πᾶσαν χωρὶς ἀθανάτων* (lines 40-41) to mean "leave all war . . . apart from the immortals"; but I do not agree with G. Fraccaroli (*Le Odi di Pindaro* [Verona 1894] 280 note 2), and Pini (above, note 3) 341-2, that to construe the phrase thus necessarily implies the belief that

between that denial and Pindar's earlier use of the myth in illustration of his maxim (a use which seems to imply acceptance of the myth as true). Either Pindar, having apparently accepted the truth of the myth by using it in illustration, changes his mind, withdraws his account, and denies the truth of the myth.⁵¹ Or Pindar pretends to believe in the truth of the myth when using it in illustration, and then proceeds to state his real view, which is that the myth is untrue.⁵² But surely both these versions are equally unacceptable.⁵³ Whichever of these two alternatives were preferred, it would be absurd for Pindar to imply acceptance of the myth by using it in illustration and then to proceed to a firm and confident denial of its truth, thereby making nonsense of his original use of it and completely undermining the maxim which it was supposed to illustrate.⁵⁴

It remains to consider some versions of the traditional interpretation which deliberately thrust into the background, or deliberately re-

Pindar denies the truth of the Heracles myth. Fraccaroli and Pini themselves construe (as did Heyne [above, note 36] *ad loc.*) "leave aside (*χωρίς*) all war . . . of the immortals"; and it must be admitted that the view that Pindar recoils from the myth without denying its truth is easier with this rendering.

⁵¹ I do not in fact know of any adherent of the traditional interpretation who holds this view of the passage. It is true that Norwood (236 note 39) appears to attribute to Fraccaroli (*op. cit.* [above, note 50] 136 f.), apropos of our passage of *Ol.* 9, the view that Pindar "really changed his mind, and withdrew statements, in a lyric just as in casual talk." (Norwood is surely right to reject any such view.) Yet Fraccaroli (*loc. cit.*) stops short of saying that Pindar, in our passage and similar passages, denies the truth of the stories which he sets aside; and elsewhere (p. 280 note 2) he explicitly says "Pindaro voleva tacere di questo argomento [the Heracles myth], ma non negarlo, chè si sarebbe contraddetto."

⁵² This is the view which Fernandez-Galiano (above, note 4) advances in his cautious acceptance of the traditional interpretation. He himself, however, admits that it is "poco lógico," and for this reason allows that Farnell's interpretation may after all be correct.

⁵³ If Farnell's account of the traditional interpretation (above, note 49) had been accurate, his outright rejection of it would have been entirely justified.

⁵⁴ It is true that something approaching a parallel to the second alternative (that Pindar pretends to believe in the myth and then denies its truth) may be found in *Ol.* 1.25-53, if the view that Pindar first embarks on the impious version of the Pelops myth, and then corrects himself and substitutes another version, is correct (see above, note 42). But if Pindar does there pretend to accept the impious version before proceeding to a denial, such a procedure could be justified as an effective way of demonstrating the dangerous lure of *δεδαίδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι . . . μῦθοι* (*Ol.* 1.29). The essential difference between *Ol.* 1 and our passage of *Ol.* 9 is that in the latter the myth is quoted *in illustration of a maxim*, which Pindar clearly does not wish to subvert.

nounce, the question of whether Pindar did or did not believe in the truth of the myth.

The approach of Bundy (above, note 3) is to subordinate, and virtually suppress, the question of Pindar's beliefs, and to explain the passage in terms of Pindar's technique in the composition of epinicians. Bundy does not devote a single detailed discussion to our passage of *Ol.* 9, but mentions it several times, in comparison or contrast with other passages, in illustration of his arguments. His analysis and classification of these passages according to their formal features is extremely intricate; on the other hand, he gives a clear account of the common function which, he believes, these multifarious types fulfil, viz. the function of highlighting, by means of the transition, the theme to which Pindar passes after dropping, rejecting, or "losing his way" in the previous theme.

Bundy's classification of passages by their formal features sometimes leads him to group them in a manner similar to Norwood's. For example, *Nem.* 3.25 f. (= 26 f.)⁵⁵ and *Pyth.* 11.38-40 (both "hush-passages" of Norwood's [above, note 45]) are compared (*II* 44 note 27), because in them Pindar proclaims that a theme is digressionary. *Nem.* 5.18 and *Ol.* 9.38 f. (= 35 f.) (Norwood's two most "startling" hush-passages) are grouped together by virtue of the deliberate introduction of unfavourable material which prompts a recoil and a transition to the next theme.⁵⁶ On the other hand, Bundy, unlike Norwood (above, note 46), sees common features in these last two passages and in the Pelops passage of *Ol.* 1 (25-53), in that the mention of Pelops' ivory shoulder (*Ol.* 1.27) is "carefully contrived" (*I* 8) in order to lead to the new version of the Pelops story, just as Pindar has "carefully contrived" (*I* 9) that the exemplum of Heracles in *Ol.* 9 should verge on impiety.

It is clear that Bundy's attention is concentrated on the alleged common rhetorical purpose of these transitions, which is to highlight

⁵⁵ Bundy (*I* 1 note 1) cites Pindaric passages from Turyn's edition. Where necessary, I add the equivalent line numbers from Bowra (ed. 2).

⁵⁶ Bundy *II* 74: "In *N.* 5.18 and *O.* 9.38 f. [= 35 f.] the *σιγά* motive becomes a highlighting device whereby unpropitious matter is converted into foil for a subsequent crescendo"; ib., note 100: "the deliberately contrived impiety in *O.* 9.31-38 [= 29-35] prompts the recoil of lines 38-44 [= 35-41]" and "the deliberately contrived μέγα ἐν δίκῃ τε μὴ κεκινδυνευμένον of *N.* 5.14 prompts the recoil of lines 16 ff."

the theme to which the transition leads. The question of Pindar's attitude to or belief in the discarded theme as apparently regarded by Bundy as being, if not⁵⁷ entirely meaningless or irrelevant, at least of secondary importance.⁵⁸

While the immense value of Bundy's contribution to the understanding of Pindar is undeniable, it may nevertheless be thought that his methods occasionally run the risk of obscuring the individuality of some of the passages which he does not select for detailed treatment.⁵⁹ At least, it seems to me that Pindar's attitude and train of thought in our passage of *Ol.* 9 need more elucidation⁶⁰ than is provided by the somewhat brief references made to this passage by Bundy in his two published studies.

We now turn to that version of the traditional interpretation which holds that Pindar remains non-committal about the truth of the myth⁶¹ but which nevertheless interprets the passage in terms of his attitude to the myth (not, as with Bundy, in terms of a rhetorically assumed pose). Such a version need not be inconsistent with some of the points we have already made. The myth of Heracles, we can continue to say (cf. p. 320 above), is especially apt in that it adds the warning that divinely-granted prowess may be put to impious use against the gods themselves. The clauses from line 35 onwards (*ἀπό μοι λόγον κτλ.*) still express (cf. p. 321 above) Pindar's attitude of mingled reverence and revulsion towards the conflicting aspects of this divinely-conferred *aretê*. But his attitude does not merely caution him into silence about the myth; it blurs his belief in its truth, allowing him neither whole-

⁵⁷ Cf. (besides Bundy's reference [above, note 56] to the "unpropitious matter" of *Nem.* 5.18 and *Ol.* 9.38 f.) his remarks (I 9) on *Ol.* 1: "they [the audience] will infer certainly that his attitude toward the traditional story [of Pelops] is unfavorable (he rejects it out of piety in line 36)."

⁵⁸ Cf. his remark (I 9): "It will be seen that such passages [he includes the relevant passages of *Ol.* 1 and *Ol.* 9] are entirely too sophisticated and rhetorical to be taken in a straightforward religious sense."

⁵⁹ Cf. the criticisms made by G. M. Kirkwood (in a review of Bundy) in *Gnomon* 35 (1963) 131, 133.

⁶⁰ Or rather, elucidation at a different level. If I may invert the remark of Bundy's quoted above (note 58), it seems to me that our passage of *Ol.* 9 (and the Pelops passage of *Ol.* 1) is too full of religious overtones to be taken in a purely rhetorical sense.

⁶¹ H. Fränkel, *Die Antike* 3 (1927) 54; perhaps Gundert (above, note 3) ("Hier geht es nicht darum, ob Pindar den Mythos geglaubt hat oder nicht," p. 49; but p. 128 note 231 "er leugnet ausdrücklich, dass Götter überhaupt kämpfen (40 f.)").

hearted acceptance nor complete critical rejection.⁶² The relationship between maxim and illustrating myth is now admittedly more nebulous than if we hold Pindar to a firm belief in the truth of the myth. But as the maxim, though expressing only the acceptable aspect of the divine conferment of *aretê*, carries within itself, as it were, the seeds of that doubt which is felt as soon as the impious potentialities of such divine endowment are perceived, it can be argued that this account of Pindar's attitude to the myth, so far from undermining the maxim, corresponds most closely to the tensions which are inherent (though not apparent on the surface) in the maxim itself.

It remains to consider Pindar's attitude to his own art as expressed in our passage and in the surrounding context.⁶³

According to Farnell's interpretation, the reproachful utterances of lines 37 ff. are directed at others who, unlike Pindar himself, accept the impious legend, who have not been chosen, *kata daimona*, to become truly *sophoi*. Pindar's attitude to his art, in this passage and throughout the ode, is thus clear, consistent, and proudly confident.

According to the traditional interpretation, Pindar's words in lines 37 ff. must be directed, at least in part, against himself—and not merely in warning against continuing with the impious tale, but in self-reproach for having already recounted it and flourished it in illustration of his maxim. Thus his attitude to his own art is ambivalent, with lines 37 ff. contrasting strongly with 21 ff., with the *sophoi* of line 28, and perhaps with lines 107 f.

We might expect to be helped towards a decision between the two interpretations by asking whether Pindar's language in lines 37 ff. compares more closely with the passage in which he definitely denies the truth of a myth (*Ol.* 1.25–53), or with those passages where he

⁶² This account of Pindar's attitude to the myth in our particular passage is perhaps the easier to accept, according as one is inclined to regard Pindar's attitude to the mythical world in general as being at least part-way along the road from literal acceptance to an entirely symbolical interpretation.

⁶³ Within our passage, apart from the references in lines 37 ff., there is the reference in the maxim (line 28) to *sophoi*, which undoubtedly refers to poets such as Pindar himself. In the immediate context there is ἐγὼ δέ τοι φίλαν πόλιν / μαλεραῖς ἐπιφλέγων ἀοιδαῖς, / καὶ ἀγάνορος ἵππου / θάσσον καὶ ναὸς ὑποπρέρου παντῇ / ἀγγελίαν πέμψω / ταύταν, εἰ σὺν τινι μοιριδίῳ παλάμα / ἐξαίρετον Χαρίτων νέμομαι κἄπον· / κείναι γὰρ ὥπασαν τὰ τερπνά (lines 21–8). Cf. also the reference to σοφίαι αἰπεινά at lines 107 f.

sets aside a theme without denying its truth (the "hush-passages" [above, note 45]); but such a comparison proves indecisive. The vehement language of *Ol.* 9 is strikingly close to that of *Ol.* 1,⁶⁴ and unlike the mild language of the "hush-passages." This alignment might be thought to favour Farnell's interpretation, by seeming to group *Ol.* 9 with *Ol.* 1 (as passages where the truth of a myth is denied) and apart from the "hush-passages" (where a theme is merely set aside). But the linguistic alignment could also be accounted for by supposing that *Ol.* 9 and *Ol.* 1 express a common attitude of repugnance towards an impious tale about the gods, whereas the "hush-passages" set aside tales (about heroes) that are completely or comparatively innocuous;⁶⁵ this then leaves us free to group *Ol.* 9, *on formal grounds*, with the "hush-passages" (in setting aside a story without denying its truth) and apart from *Ol.* 1 (which denies the truth of a myth), and thus to admit the traditional interpretation. Again, if the vehement language of *Ol.* 1 were indubitably directed only at others who accept an impious myth, that factor might count in favour of Farnell's interpretation, which explains the vehement language of *Ol.* 9 in a similar way. But as we have seen (above, note 42), it is possible that in *Ol.* 1 Pindar himself embarks on the impious version, and therefore directs the reproaches which follow in part against himself; *Ol.* 1 would then provide a parallel example of the kind of impassioned self-reproach which is postulated in *Ol.* 9 by the traditional interpretation.

The attitude to his own art which Pindar (on the traditional interpretation) adopts in our passage can perhaps be best understood in the light of his attitude to the Heracles myth, as we have tried to explain it. We have suggested that the maxim ἀγαθοὶ κατὰ δαίμον' ἄνδρες ἐγένοντο implied, for Pindar, not only the divine conferment of prowess but also the impious use to which such prowess might be put, both aspects being exemplified in the myth of Heracles. We may now

⁶⁴ With ἀπό . . . ῥῆψον (*Ol.* 9.35 f.) cf. ἀφίσταμαι (*Ol.* 1.52); with λοιδορῆσαι θεούς (*Ol.* 9.37) cf. ἀκέρδεια λέλογχεν θαμινὰ κακαγόρους (*Ol.* 1.53).

⁶⁵ It is true that the theme of passage (a) (above, note 45) is objectionable, but the comparative mildness of Pindar's language there is accounted for partly by the fact that he does not recount, but merely hints at, the disagreeable tale, and partly by the fact that objectionable tales about heroes do not prompt such strong revulsion as those about gods (cf. Bowra 67-69).

add that σοφοὶ κατὰ δαίμον' ἄνδρες ἐγένοντο was felt by Pindar to be double-edged in the same way, that divinely conferred *sophia* also has both noble and impious potentialities, that the poet, therefore, must take care to speak well of the gods and not exercise, *para kairon*, an *echthra sophia*. The passage is thus given a kind of unity by the doubly-felt tension of Pindar's attitude to *both* divinely conferred *aretê* and divinely conferred *sophia*.

Thus on all major issues, whether relevance of maxim to myth, train of thought within the passage, or attitude to the poetic art in the passage and the surrounding context, Farnell's interpretation emerges as clearly superior, if the criteria to be applied are clarity, consistency, precision, and self-confidence. On the traditional interpretation, on the other hand, the passage is marked by tension, complexity, profundity, and, perhaps, a unity of a less obvious kind. Although it is impossible to eradicate all doubt, it seems, on balance, that the latter group of qualities, and therefore the traditional interpretation, are more in accordance with the nature of Pindar's poetry.